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“Those who don’t know history are destined
to repeat it.”
		
(Edmund Burke)

It has become increasingly, and sometimes
frustratingly, clear that in the past few years
some researchers working with non-human
animals either have forgotten (or were never
taught) the perils of inadvertent cuing. I
wrote this article after completing another
journal review in which the methodology
involved an experimenter presenting two
or more choices to an animal. The experimenter prepared the trial, presented it,
watched the animal as it made its response,
and then recorded that response. In this
case, as in some others in our field, the test
itself was creative, unique, and exciting, and
the performance by the animals tested was
adequate to suggest they might be doing
something interesting and perhaps reflective
of cognitive processing. But, the possibility
that cuing might have occurred dampened
my enthusiasm for the project, and dampened my spirits about the state and future
of the field in general because too many
papers get through the peer review process
without having proper controls for cuing.
In the interests of full disclosure, I cannot
say I have always been perfect in preventing
any chance of cuing in the tests I have done
with animals, but I do worry that more and
more often there is not even the recognition
of the need to control for possible cuing in
experiments assessing animal cognition.
When I started graduate school, the first
project I worked on involved computerized
testing of chimpanzees that were learning
to match Arabic numerals to dots on the
screen. They saw a numeral, and had to collect dots, one-at-a-time, until they indicated
they thought they had the right number. If
they were right, the computer played a tone,
and if wrong, it played a buzz. My job was to
give them a treat when they were right, and
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of course to also try to keep them engaged
in the task in general. The first thing I was
told, though, was “never look at the computer screen while they are working. If you
do not know how they are doing until the
computer tells you, you cannot cue them
while they are working.”
Hence the problem when the experimenter watches the response. He or she
knows the correct response, and almost
certainly hopes the animal will make that
response (otherwise, no publication, no
degree, no grant, no tenure, etc.). In this
case, experimenter expectation rears its ugly
head, and cannot be controlled. It is not my
intention in this article to “call out” any particular researcher or team of researchers, but
it is critical to get the attention of those who
are failing to design adequate methods for
controlling inadvertent cuing. Some of these
groups make (or, at least, report) almost no
attempt to control for cuing, whereas others
do implement some design aspects to address
cuing, but not enough. Sometimes, one reads
in manuscripts or in published articles something like “the experimenter looked straight
ahead, did not look at the animal, did not
respond to the animal, or otherwise did not
give any feedback to the animal during its
response.” Plain and simple, this is not possible to conclude. This was exactly the lesson
of the horse named Clever Hans, a lesson that
is now more than 100 years old, but also one
that seems to be increasingly forgotten.
Clever Hans was, indeed, an incredibly
clever animal. The problem was that he was
clever in ways not related to the apparent
intellect that first drew attention to him.
Initially, it was believed that Hans was capable of all kinds of mathematical and computational feats (pun intended, given that
Hans responded to questions by tapping his
hoof). He consistently provided the correct
answer to all manner of questions. And,
initially, some of the foremost experts on

animal behavior validated his performance
as reflecting true cognitive skill. However,
this was not true. Instead, the cleverness of
Hans was reflected in his acute sensitivity to
subtle cues given by those who asked him
questions. The mystery was solved when it
became clear that Hans only answered questions correctly when the people asking the
question and watching his answer also knew
the answer themselves (Pfungst, 1911). Hans
was using tension, concentration, relaxation,
some changes in posture, and other similar
kinds of bodily cues that people exhibited as
he was responding. Thus became the critical lesson of Clever Hans – if you know the
answer, you should not ask the question and
score the response given by the participant.
If you do, the possibility for cuing exists, and
the potential for erroneous interpretations
of the responses of subjects also exists.
This concern about cuing, in fact, partially inspired the development of the one
of the most important, and longest lasting,
apparatus used in comparative psychology –
Harlow’s Wisconsin General Test Apparatus
(WGTA; Harlow and Bromer, 1938; Harlow,
1949). One point of the WGTA (and of even
earlier apparatus that were precursors to the
WGTA) was to make sure that the animal
could not see the experimenter at all during the set-up of trials and during its own
response. Instead, the experimenter viewed
the animal in a one-directional manner, preventing any possible cues from occurring.
Subsequent use of versions of the WGTA
occurred in many animal laboratories, and
the development of computerized testing
with non-human primates (e.g., Rumbaugh
et al., 1989) and then other species also was
at least partly due to the desire to eliminate
the potential for cuing of subjects. And,
of course, test boxes of other kinds (e.g.,
Skinner boxes) used with pigeons, rats,
and other animals eliminated this concern
as well.
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Note that this is not a concern only for
animal researchers. It is a possibility with
any test subject. All too often in developmental studies, for example, researchers
act as if such cues are not possible with
human children (or, for that matter, with
adult human participants). And, in comparative psychology, especially in tests of
comparative cognition, the methods are
often adopted and adapted from developmental psychology. Hence, the problem
compounds. Even worse is when research
teams, when asked why they do not have
adequate controls, respond by saying “this
is how it is done with children, or by group
X who did it before us with species Y.” This
is an entirely inadequate and misguided justification. My contention is that any study
that fails to control for cuing is flawed, and it
should not be replicated, at least with regard
to the methodological details that allowed
for the potential cuing to occur.
One might ask whether the problem
is really that worrisome, and the answer
is a resounding yes. First, many empirical
comparative studies looking at cognitive
processes involve only a small number of
subjects, and these studies are rarely replicated by other laboratories or with other
subjects (see Agrillo and Miletto Petrazzini,
2012). So, the first report is often the only
one, and a positive report of some new
behavioral phenomenon is likely to be
highly cited, and highly influential on theory and subsequent work in that topic area.
But if the possibility of cuing exists, we are
then stuck with equivocal data, and perhaps
erroneous conclusions.
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Remembering Clever Hans

The problem of cuing can be even
worse when the phenomenon of interest
might have practical, real-world implications. One of the best examples of this
comes from a recent paper by Lit et al.
(2011). They tested whether the beliefs of
human handlers could impact the behavior of scent dogs – dogs trained to provide
critical services by finding drugs or explosives. When human handlers thought
(incorrectly) that a site was baited with a
relevant scent, they reported that the dogs
more often alerted at those locations. In
other words, Lit and colleagues showed
that the handlers’ beliefs affected what
the dogs did.
The solution is simple: remember Clever
Hans! Teach students his story, and engrain
in them the need to, at minimum, run control trials/sessions in which possible cuing
is prevented, so that they can see whether
responding remains the same as when such
controls are not present. Even better, eliminate possible cuing totally, through the use
of multiple experimenters who either see
what the animal does (but do not know
what it should do) or who prepare trials but
then do not see what response the animal
makes. This will let us increase our confidence that the animal sitting across from us
is responding on the basis of its own learning, or its own “thinking,” rather than on
the basis of adjusting its responses based
on how we are reacting to what it is doing.
By doing this, we will put the Clever Hans
Effect back in the barn, and out of view,
while keeping Clever Hans the reminder in
full view.
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